This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of juvenile crime punishment on high school completion and adult recidivism using administrative data from a southern U.S. state. We exploit random assignment of cases to judges and use idiosyncratic judge stringency in imprisonment to estimate the causal e¤ect of incarceration. We …nd that juvenile incarceration increases the propensity of being convicted for a drug o¤ense in adulthood while it lowers the propensity to be convicted of a property crime. Juvenile incarceration has also a detrimental e¤ect on high school completion for earlier cohorts, but it has no impact on later cohorts.
Introduction
Since the seminal work of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) , the fundamental theoretical predictions of the economic model of criminal behavior have been con…rmed by a large number of studies. The certainty of punishment, represented by an increased probability of arrests or increased police force, has been shown to exert a signi…cant deterrent e¤ect on crime. 1 There is also a sizable literature investigating the extent to which the severity of punishment impacts criminal proclivity. Researchers identi…ed the deterrent e¤ect of prison sentences using creative strategies and novel data sets (see, for example, Drago et al. 2009; Abrams 2012; and Kuziemko 2013 ). 2 On the other hand, there exist studies that document the harmful consequences of time spent in prison on such outcomes as future employment and re-o¤ending propensity (see, for example, Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2013;
and Mueller-Smith 2015). Potential explanations for these …ndings include exposure to other convicted criminals in tough prison conditions and the resultant enhancement of criminal human capital, as well as depreciation of legal human capital due to lack of rehabilitation opportunities.
The question of whether harsh criminal sanctions deter criminal activity is important not only for scienti…c inquiry, but also for public policy. This is because substantial resources 1 This impact has been documented in a variety of empirical designs, using data from di¤erent settings ranging from New York City (Corman and Mocan 2000) to Buenos Aires (Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004), to London (Draca et al. 2011 ). 2 The analysis of the impact of sentence lengths on criminal proclivity is complicated by the fact that longer sentences can reduce crime through two channels. First, longer sentences can decrease crime because they incapacitate the o¤enders and thus prevent them from committing new crimes while in prison. Second, longer sentences provide a signal to the marginal criminal regarding enhanced sanctions, and therefore alter the behavior of potential criminals. This second, deterrence, channel is particularly important to identify both from an academic and policy point of view. terrence e¤ect.
In this paper we contribute to this literature by examining the impact of juvenile punishment on individuals'educational and delinquency outcomes using data from multiple state agencies in Louisiana. We link the case …les in the juvenile justice system to state's administrative records (public school and adult incarceration) to observe juvenile o¤enders' educational attainment (high school completion) and their future criminal activity (adult criminal conviction).
Louisiana is interesting to analyze because of a number of reasons. First, it has the highest imprisonment rate in the U.S. with 760 inmates per 100,000 population (compared to the national rate of 450) in 2016 and correction expenditures cost the state more than a billion dollars per year (Department of Education, Policy and Program Studies Service 2016; and Carson 2018) . Second, Louisiana also has a very high adult recidivism rate with almost half of the o¤enders returning to prison within …ve years of their release (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections 2018). Finally, while its …ve million population is about the median among all U.S. states, this population size is similar to many small size countries, such as Norway, Denmark, and Ireland, and the state exhibits substantial heterogeneity in such dimensions as racial diversity and urbanicity.
To address potential endogeneity of juvenile incarceration, we exploit random assignment of defendants to judges, construct an indicator of judge stringency in incarceration, and use it as an instrument for juvenile incarceration. More speci…cally, we exploit the fact that juvenile court judges have discretion in sentencing, and that they di¤er in their harshness in assigning punishment to juveniles. Under certain assumptions (discussed below), our estimation strategy allows us to obtain a weighted average of treatment e¤ects for juveniles at the margin of incarceration. The detail of the data also allows us to utilize information on the types of crimes committed, as well as the type and duration of punishment imposed, both as a juvenile and as an adult. We use this additional information to shed some light on potential mechanisms.
Using idiosyncratic harshness of judges as our source of identi…cation, we …nd that having been incarcerated as a juvenile has no impact on the probability of being convicted for a violent crime as an adult, but that it makes future property crime convictions less likely. 4 On the other hand, incarceration as a juvenile increases the propensity of being convicted for a drug o¤ense in adulthood. We propose mechanisms related to emotional stress endured in prison stay and the existence of well-structured rehabilitation programs for incarcerated juveniles to explain our …ndings. Several robustness checks and additional estimations addressing various sample selection issues strongly support our …ndings.
Turning to the relationship between juvenile incarceration and high school completion, we …nd that while incarceration had a detrimental impact on high school completion propensity in cohorts born before 1983, it had no impact on later cohorts (younger individuals). This is arguably because the school reforms (high school graduation exit exams) implemented in Louisiana beginning with the 2000-20001 academic year made it more di¢ cult to obtain a high school diploma, which in turn led to a decline in the graduation rate of the nonincarcerated population, while not altering the already-low graduation rate of those who are incarcerated.
This paper contributes to a growing body of literature that investigates the causal e¤ects 4 As shown below, the estimated e¤ect for violent crime convictions is very sensitive (i.e., ‡ips sign) to di¤erent sample restrictions which reinforces the inference of a null-e¤ect. of the severity of juvenile punishment (Hjalmarsson 2009; and Aizer and Doyle 2015) . Our results on juvenile incarceration di¤er from those reported in Aizer and Doyle (2015) who employed a similar identi…cation strategy, and found across-the board positive impact of juvenile incarceration on adult recidivism. 5 We explore the potential reasons for the differences in the results obtained from the Chicago/Cook county sample of Aizer and Doyle (2015) and from our Louisiana sample, including di¤erences in community type (urban-rural di¤erences) and potentially di¤erent treatment of juveniles while in prison in the two settings.
The discrepancy in the results are important as they point to the heterogeneous e¤ects of incarceration across crime types and across jurisdictions and they highlight the importance of even further investigation. This paper also contributes to the strand of the literature that exploits random assignment of case …les to judges and use judicial stringency in de- 
Juvenile Justice System in Louisiana
In Louisiana, youth through age 17 may enter the juvenile justice system when they are accused of committing a crime and arrested or referred by the police to a juvenile court.
Having received a formal complaint from a local law o¢ cer, the District Attorney's (DA) O¢ ce must decide whether or not to petition the case to the court. Prosecutors may choose not to do so because of lack of su¢ cient evidence. Alternatively, to prevent incarceration, 5 Straightforward comparison of our results with Hjalmarsson (2009) may not be feasible for two reasons. First, we consider di¤erent margins (judge disagreements versus case …les near cuto¤). Second, Hjalmarsson (2009) focused only on juvenile recidivism. the DA's O¢ ce may choose to enter into an informal agreement (diversion program) with the juvenile and the parents which occasionally entails a child to participate in community service, restitution, or treatment and comply with certain behavioral requirements such as school attendance (Louisiana Children's Code CHC 631). Finally, prosecutors may proceed with a petition. When the case moves to adjudication, the disposition must be determined by a judge (Louisiana Children's Code CHC 650-675).
Under the provisions of the Louisiana juvenile justice system, a computer generated random allotment (open to public) is implemented on a daily basis by the Clerk's o¢ ce for all …rst time case …les …led in each district court. 6 Therefore, random assignment to judges within each district court is true for …rst time juvenile o¤enders. Repeat o¤enders are reassigned to the judge who handled the initial case.
Judges may simply dismiss the case if the prosecutor is unable to provide evidence to …nd the youth delinquent. The defendant would then be found not guilty and does not enter into the juvenile justice system. If the judge …nds the defendant guilty, the judge has to make a disposition decision. Disposed youth is either assigned to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections to be con…ned in secure placement (incarcerated) or placed in a non-secure facility or on probation. Non-secure facilities were established for youth that encountered problems at home and have nowhere else to go, and they generally include foster care, group homes and short and long-term treatment facilities. Judges have to also assign a disposition length (sentence length) regardless of the disposition type. 7 In other words, each 6 Rules for Louisiana District Courts, Chapter 14, Appendix 14.0A, various years. 7 Judges are responsible for weighing the severity of the o¤ense committed and the prior o¤ense of the youth. In general, they shall impose the least restrictive disposition consistent with the circumstances of the case, the health and safety of the child, and the best interest of the society (Louisiana Children's Code CHC 683).
Our …rst outcome of interest is adult conviction at age 25 or earlier. In order to measure criminal recidivism without any censoring, we limit our focus to juvenile case …les from 1996 to 2004, corresponding to the cohorts born between 1979 and 1987. Put di¤erently, we focus on the universe of convicted juveniles who were born between 1979 and 1987, and follow them until each one reaches the age of 25 to observe their criminal conviction activity as young adults. Later in the paper, we drop the restriction of "adult crime by age 25" and focus on the same cohort of convicted juveniles (who were born between 1979 and 1987) but follow them until the year 2012 to observe their criminal convictions until 2012. In this second set-up, we analyze the same group of juveniles, but the age in which the adult crime is committed can be as high as 33.
The case …les of juveniles are randomly assigned to judges, except for repeat o¤enders whose cases are handled by the original judge. Thus, we mainly focus on o¤enders who had only one interaction with the juvenile justice system. Put di¤erently, to ensure random assignment of case …les to judges, we include only one-time juvenile o¤enders in the e¤ective sample. As discussed in detail in Online Appendix C, we also provide robustness checks using all …rst-time o¤enders over our sample period. 8 Although it is not a common occurrence, juveniles may have committed multiple o¤enses. For those cases, we consider the most severe decision among all convictions as their disposition outcome. 9 As detailed below, because we control for court-by-year …xed e¤ects (which is the unit of randomization) we restrict the sample to the dispositions from those courts that had at least two regular judges in a given 8 Another important selection issue pertains to cases that were dismissed. We address this concern, again in Online Appendix C, by exploiting the institutional settings of the Louisiana juvenile justice system. Speci…cally, we limit our analysis to youth who plead guilty (judge did not make a guilty/not guilty decision) and estimate the impacts accordingly. 9 Eight percent of our e¤ective sample has committed multiple juvenile o¤enses.
year. Finally, we exclude individuals whose disposition judge has handled fewer than 25 juvenile case …les over the entire sample period. Doing so alleviates concerns pertaining to noise in the construction of judge stringency measure. Having imposed these restrictions, we end up with a total of 7,371 juvenile case …les. Table 1 shows that incarcerated juveniles are more likely to be black and male. Forty-one percent of the incarcerated juveniles are convicted of property crimes. As columns (3) and (5) of Panel B demonstrate, incarcerated juveniles are more likely to recidivate as an adult in comparison to those who are placed on probation or placed in non-secure custody. Adult conviction rate is 54.7 percent among those who are incarcerated as a juvenile, but the rate is 33.5 percent for the non-incarcerated juvenile delinquents. Finally, high school graduation rate for those who are incarcerated as a juvenile is lower than those who are convicted but not incarcerated. 11 A comparison of our juvenile sample with Chicago/Cook County population used in Aizer and Doyle (2015) reveals striking di¤erences: (i) juveniles in our sample are more likely to 10 This last category (other crimes) includes all other o¤enses, ranging from jury misconduct to criminal trespass, from hit and run driving to aggravated incest. 11 We should note that potential attrition due to migration is unlikely to be an issue in this setting. Analyzing the American Community Survey data (2003 and 2004), we …nd that only 4.8 percent of individuals born in Louisiana between 1978 and 1987 left the state between the ages of 18 and 25. The out-migration rate is even lower (2.2 percent) among the same age cohort if we focus on those with an education of high school or lower. 
Baseline Model
To estimate the e¤ect of juvenile incarceration on recidivism, we consider the following model
where Y i is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the individual i, who has been convicted of a crime as a juvenile, is convicted of a crime as an adult (until the age of 25, or alternatively until the age of 33). The variable of interest, Incarceration i , is another indicator variable that takes the value of one if juvenile had been incarcerated as a result of his/her juvenile conviction. If Incarceration i is zero, this indicates that even though the individual was convicted of a crime as a juvenile, he/she was not incarcerated. Rather To address the potential endogeneity of juvenile incarceration, we construct a measure of judge stringency, and employ this measure as an instrument for the juvenile's propensity for being incarcerated following his/her juvenile conviction. 13 More speci…cally, we exploit the fact that juvenile court judges have discretion in sentencing, that they di¤er in their harshness in assigning punishment to juveniles, and that juvenile defenders are randomly assigned to judges. Thus, we can investigate the impact of a juvenile's sentence severity on his/her propensity to be convicted as an adult, using the idiosyncratic harshness of the judge (who sentenced the juvenile) as an instrument for juvenile's incarceration experience. Under certain assumptions (discussed below), the estimated e¤ect converges to a weighted average of treatment e¤ects for juveniles at the margin of incarceration, the so-called Local Average 13 We tried using alternative instruments for juvenile incarceration. For example, Eren and Mocan (2017) show that unexpected losses of the football team of Louisiana's ‡agship university increase sentence lengths assigned by judges during the week following the game, but such game outcomes have no signi…cant impact on the likelihood of the incarceration decision. The lack of a strong correlation limits our ability to exploit exogenous variation stemming from game outcomes. 
Judge Stringency as an Instrument
To create the instrument, we use all past and future juvenile case …les handled by each judge over the period from 1996 to 2012. There are 73 judges in our e¤ective sample and the average number of conviction per judge is 238. Once the juvenile is convicted of the crime, the judge makes a decision regarding the disposition type. As detailed in the previous section, the disposition type is either incarceration in secure custody (prison), non-secure custody, or probation.
For each judge-juvenile pair, we calculate the leave-out mean incarceration rate of the judge as follows
where JS in Incarceration j(i) stands for judge's stringency in incarceration, calculated for the ith case handled by the jth judge; n j is the total number of one-time case …les handled by judge j. As detailed below, the validity of judge stringency as an instrument for juvenile incarceration hinges on random assignment of case …les to judges. This crucial assumption calls for controlling the unit of randomization in all …rst and second stage equations. Includ- 14 One can interpret any di¤erences in adult conviction for juvenile o¤enders who are assigned to more or less stringent judges as the causal e¤ect of the change in the probability of juvenile incarceration associated with judge assignment. Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ing the court-by-year …xed e¤ects allows us to interpret the variation in the propensity of a randomly assigned judge to incarcerate a juvenile relative to the case …les in a given court and year. The mean of judge stringency in incarceration is 0.21 with a standard deviation of 0.05. Figure 1 plots the distribution of (mean-standardized) residualized judge stringency.
They are obtained from a regression of judge stringency in incarceration (shown in equation
2) on court-by-year …xed e¤ects and juvenile controls shown in Table 1 . Figure 1 demonstrates non-negligible identifying variation in the data. For example, moving from the least stringent judge to the most stringent raises the probability of incarceration by around 29 percentage points. Put di¤erently, consider two juvenile defendants of the same age, race and gender, and who are convicted of the same crime in the same year in the same courthouse. The …rst juvenile may be up to 29 percentage points more likely to go to prison (incarcerated) as opposed to be placed on probation or non-secure custody if his/her case is handled by a more strict judge in comparison to the second juvenile (see also Figure B1 in Online Appendix B for the raw distribution of judge stringency).
To investigate whether judge stringency in incarceration is a strong predictor of juvenile incarceration decision we estimate the following …rst-stage regression
where X i includes court-by-year …xed e¤ects, all other variables are as previously de…ned,
and " ijct is the error term. Table 2 presents the …rst stage results from three speci…cations. Column (1) shows that 14 00872 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology absent any controls, having been assigned to a judge who is 10 percentage points more likely to incarcerate a juvenile increases the likelihood of placement into secure custody by about 8 percentage points. Including juvenile demographic controls (Column 2) and detailed o¤ense …xed e¤ects (Column 3) do not alter the estimated impact of judge stringency in incarceration, indicating that the instrument is strongly related to the endogenous variable.
The …rst-stage F statistic from the last column of Table 2 is 30.
Instrument Validity
Although JS in Incarceration j(i) is a strong predictor of juvenile incarceration, there are three additional conditions that must be met for us to interpret the coe¢ cient estimate from an IV speci…cation as the LATE of juvenile incarceration.
Conditional Independence
The …rst assumption is that of independence; i.e. the instrument must be uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome equation. Under random assignment of juvenile case …les to judges, this condition is likely to hold. A typical test for this is to run a series of regressions where judge stringency is regressed on juvenile/case characteristics, while controlling for court-by-year …xed e¤ects. These randomization test results are reported in Table 3 . Each cell represents a separate regression. The coe¢ cient estimates on juvenile/case characteristics are very small in all regressions, and with one exception, none of them is statistically di¤erent from zero. 15 Note also that the estimated e¤ect of being convicted of a felony is small in magnitude, only 1.2 percent relative to mean 15 An increase in the number of tests increase the likelihood of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis, the so-called multiplicity problem. Speci…cally, out of 8 separate hypotheses, the probability of falsely rejecting at least one of the 8 null hypotheses at the 10% level is 1-0.9 8 =0.58. Therefore, rejection of one hypothesis among many does not necessarily pose a threat to randomization. judge stringency in incarceration. We also run a single regression using all juvenile/case characteristics. The p value for joint signi…cance is 0.27 which is reported in the last row of Table 3 . Thus, the evidence presented here coupled with the fact that the coe¢ cient of judge stringency in incarceration in the …rst-stage regressions of Table 2 are insensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables provides assurance regarding conditional independence assumption. We ran similar regressions using the incarceration indicator as the outcome of interest and found almost all individual and case characteristics to be strong predictors of juvenile incarceration. These results are reported in Table B1 in Online Appendix
B.
Exclusion Restriction In our design, estimating equation (1) using instrumental variables assumes that the instrument, JS in Incarceration j(i) has an impact on an outcome (e.g., recidivism, or high school completion) only through the incarceration channel. In other words, it is assumed that the stringency of the judge in incarceration has no direct impact on the outcome, nor does it impact the outcome through some other channel. But, incarcerated juveniles spend time in prison, and it could be the case that more stringent judges are not only more likely to incarcerate, but they are also more likely to assign longer prison sentences. If this is the case, the instrument would impact two components related to juvenile's punishment: (i) whether or not the juvenile gets incarcerated, and (ii) the length of time spent in prison, given incarceration. In this case, the exclusion restriction would be 16 00872 9
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Equation (4a) is the same as in equation (1) with one di¤erence: The outcome of interest Y i , (e.g., adult recidivism), is assumed to depend not only on individual's incarceration experience as a juvenile, but also on how long that person was incarcerated (T ime Spent in Pr ison).
Put di¤erently, both the extensive and intensive margins of incarceration experience are assumed to impact the outcome Y i . This formulation calls for two instruments: one for incarceration, the other for time spent in prison. The detail of our data allows us to generate these two instruments.
As mentioned in Section 2, each convicted juvenile is assigned a sentence length by the judge regardless of whether or not he/she gets incarcerated. This means that we can also measure the judge's stringency in sentencing. Analogous to (2) the leave-one-out measure of judge stringency in sentencing can be calculated as
This formulation suggests that the model in equation (4a) can be estimated with instrumental variables, where the …rst endogenous dummy variable (incarceration) can be instrumented with the judge's propensity to incarcerate, and the second endogenous variable (time spent in prison) can be instrumented with judge's harshness in assigning sentence 16 Of course, even when this exclusion restriction were to be violated one can still interpret the estimates from a reduced form equation as the causal impact of judge stringency on adult recidivism. 
When we estimate the …rst stage regression (4d), however, we …nd that JS in Sentencing j(i) has no power in explaining the actual time spent in prison (in hundred days). The estimated coe¢ cient 2 in equation (4d) is 0.062 with a p value of 0.17, indicating that judge stringency in sentencing cannot be used as an instrument to explain the variation in time spent in prison. This is because of two reasons. First, even though all convicted juveniles are assigned a sentence length by judges, about three-quarters of all convicted juveniles are not incarcerated (see Table 1 ). For this group, time spent in prison is zero, and therefore there is no relationship between assigned sentence length and actual time in prison. The remaining group serves time in prison, but even in this case, actual time spent in prison is less than the sentence assigned by the judge for a number of di¤erent reasons such as early release or being placed on parole.
Thus, we focus on equations (1)-(3) to identify the impact of incarceration, using judge stringency in incarceration as an instrument. Of course, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the exclusion restriction holds in this speci…cation. In other words, does the instrument (JS in Incarceration j(i) ) have an impact on the outcome Y i through another channel, perhaps through its impact on time served in prison?
We show that this is not the case. Consider the regression results reported in Table 4 . Monotonicity Finally, in order to treat our point estimates as LATE from IV regressions, monotonicity has to be assumed. This assumption requires individuals who are incarcerated by a lenient judge would also be incarcerated by a more strict judge, and those who are not incarcerated by a strict judge wouldn't be incarcerated by a lenient judge either. An Tables B2 and B3 in Online Appendix B provides several …rst stage results by juvenile and case characteristics.
The estimated coe¢ cients of judge stringency are positive and signi…cant for all subgroups.
Another testable implication of monotonicity is that judges who are more strict for one group (e.g. felony crimes) should also be strict for another group (e.g. misdemeanors). To Tables B2 and B3 in Online Appendix B, this is indeed the case. We also relax the monotonicity assumption by recalculating the judge stringency by o¤ense severity (e.g., felony vs. non-felony). As shown in Online Appendix C, the results remain intact. 17 Finally, we …nd that around 42 percent of juvenile o¤enders in our sample are compliers meaning that they would have been incarcerated had their case been assigned to the most strict judge instead of the most lenient judge. Seventeen percent of our sample are always takers and 41 percent are never takers meaning that they would be always incarcerated, or would be never incarcerated, respectively, regardless of the judge assigned. Note also that compliers in our sample are more likely to be male and are more likely to be convicted of a 17 An overwhelming majority of our sample consists of males (75 percent). Convicted females have di¤erent o¤ense pro…les than males and around 12 percent were incarcerated (223 females). Consequently, several judges (more than one-third) are assigned a value of zero as their mean incarceration rate in the reverse instrument exercise. This leads to a low predictive (but positive) power in the males' …rst stage regression. Naturally, this is not the case for females. The point estimate on mean incarceration rate for males in the females'…rst stage regression is 0.410 (0.232). (Table B4 in Online Appendix B). 18 5 Results
Baseline Results
We …rst present the OLS results obtained by estimating equation (1) . The estimates, shown in Table 5 , are based on three di¤erent speci…cations. Column (1) provides OLS estimates of the impact of juvenile incarceration controlling for court-by-year …xed e¤ects. Column geneity. 19 The coe¢ cient estimates are positive and signi…cantly di¤erent for drug o¤enses, for violent crimes, as well as for property crimes. The last column of Table 5 presents the complier-weighted results to account for potential e¤ect of heterogeneity. We use complier weights to ensure that the proportion of compliers matches the share of estimation sample. 20 The coe¢ cients from this exercise are similar to those results without weighting. Thus, 18 We follow Dahl et al. (2014) in calculating the share of compliers and their sample averages. 19 We do not analyze crimes that are not classi…ed as a drug crime, property crime, or violent crime. These residual crimes constitute a small fraction of all adult crime in the data (3 percent of all adult convictions). As noted, they are a highly heterogeneous group, including crimes ranging from jury misconduct to criminal trespass, from hit and run driving to aggravated incest. 20 To address potential endogeneity of youth incarceration, we estimate the same models within the framework of equations (1) and (2); instrumenting youth incarceration with JS in Incarceration. The results are di¤erent from those obtained by estimating equation (1) . Panel A of Table 6 shows that the impact of incarceration on adult crime is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero for marginal convicted juveniles. Speci…cally, the third column of Table 6 shows that if the person was convicted of a crime and was incarcerated as a juvenile (incarcerated on the margin, due to having faced a tough judge) he/she is only one percentage point more likely to get convicted of a crime as an adult (3 percent increase relative to sample mean) and the point estimate is not statistically di¤erent from zero. Thus, the IV results in Panel (A) of Table 6 reveal that incarceration for marginal convicted juveniles has no statistically signi…cant impact on adult convictions when the dependent variable does not make a distinction between crime types. Table 6 Table 1 , the estimated e¤ect on property crime is large. That being said, recall that these estimated impacts reveal the e¤ect of incarceration for those who were incarcerated where the judge assignment induced a change in the incarceration decision. The e¤ects on the margin can potentially be very di¤erent than those for the average incarcerated juvenile. Relatedly, juveniles on the margin can have very di¤erent adult crime conviction rates leading to di¤erent sized e¤ects.
Panels B, C and D of
Consistent with the strong …rst-stage relationship reported in Table 2 , the reduced-form regressions reported in the last column of Table 6 show that the stringency in incarceration of the juvenile court judge has a signi…cant negative impact on adult property crime, and a positive e¤ect on adult drug crime.
In summary, juvenile incarceration, triggered by exposure to a harsher juvenile judge, has a deterrent e¤ect on adult property crime conviction, it has a positive impact on conviction from a drug o¤ense as an adult, and has no e¤ect on adult violent crime. 21 A number of omitted variables in equation (1) may explain the di¤erence in the results between OLS and IV speci…cations reported in Tables 5 and 6 . For example, parental …nancial well-being is not observed in our data and thus it is embedded in the error term in equation (1). Financial well-being and juvenile incarceration are likely to be negatively correlated. It is conceivable that …nancial well-being and adult drug (property) convictions are positively (negatively) correlated. If this is the case, the OLS estimate of the impact of juvenile incarceration on drug (property) convictions is biased downward (upward).
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We undertake several sensitivity checks to examine the robustness of our results and also investigated heterogeneous e¤ects. These results are presented in Online Appendix C.
Potential Mechanisms
It can be argued that the deterrence e¤ect of being convicted of a property crime (see Table   6 ) may be due to incapacitation. Juveniles who spend time in a secure detention facility will have fewer opportunities to recidivate after they are released if they have served time in detention beyond the age of 18. 22 To check the validity of this mechanism, we examined the impact of juvenile incarceration on adult convictions that took place after age 19, or after age 21. The results, displayed in Online Appendix B Table B5 , remain intact, indicating that they are not an artifact of juveniles being incarcerated until age 19 or 21.
Recall the discussion in Section 4.3, where we have shown that time served in prison is not related to judge stringency in incarceration, holding constant incarceration. At the same time, there is variation in time served among those who were incarcerated. To investigate whether the impact of juvenile incarceration on recidivism is di¤erent between those who spent more vs. less time in detention, we re-estimated the models by creating a sample of juveniles by excluding those who served longer than 209 days (which is the median time served, conditional on incarceration), and another sample that excludes those who stayed in prison shorter than 209 days. We acknowledge that dividing the sample based on an endogenous variable is problematic, and therefore caution is warranted in interpreting the 22 Judges can set a maximum duration of disposition up to the youth's 21 th birthday. If the residual sentence beyond the 18th birthday is short (i.e., under a year), the juvenile may complete his/her sentence at the juvenile facility. If it's a period of some years, the balance should be served in an adult facility. (1) and (2) in Panel (C) of Table 7 show that the impact of being incarcerated as a juvenile on the margin, due to idiosyncratic judge harshness, reduces the propensity of being convicted of a property crime as an adult, but that this deterrent e¤ect is not largely di¤erent between those who stayed in prison shorter or longer than the median time. In other words, time spent in prison does not seem to in ‡uence the magnitude of the deterrent e¤ect of incarceration in case of property crimes.
Panel B shows that, consistent with the previous results, adult violent crime conviction is not impacted by juvenile incarceration, regardless of the duration of incarceration. Turning to drug crime conviction results presented in Panel A of Table 7 , we observe that, although the hypothesis of the equality of the coe¢ cient estimates from Columns (1) and (2) cannot be rejected, the estimated e¤ect is considerably larger if time spent in incarceration is longer than 209 days. This could be because of three possible reasons. First, longer duration in incarceration increases exposure to other convicted juveniles and this negative peer e¤ect might be the driver for adult drug conviction. This explanation is unlikely because peer e¤ects explanation would be equally applicable in case of violent and property crime convictions as adult, but no di¤erence in the e¤ect of juvenile incarceration exists between shorter vs. longer prison stays for these crimes. Second, negative selection could be the reason:
those who end up staying longer in prison, conditional on incarceration, could be di¤erent from those who spend less time in prison. The unobservable, likely pre-existing, attributes of these long-stayers might be responsible for their higher recidivism rates (endogenous selection, as discussed above). This explanation, while plausible, is also inconsistent with the other results reported in Table 7 , because under this scenario one would observe di¤erential recidivism rates between those who spend less and more time in prison in other crime cate-25 00872 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology gories as well, but this is not the case. Relatedly, note also that all speci…cations in Table 7 control for detailed juvenile o¤ense types (136 o¤ense …xed e¤ects). A third explanation is that longer time spent in incarceration might induce additional stress on juveniles and this might impact their emotional well-being, making them more susceptible to drug use. 23 In our data, 95 percent of all drug convictions receive either a suspended sentence or probation, which indicates that the overwhelming majority of drug conviction are related to drug use, rather than drug selling. This suggests that longer jail time would make the marginal juveniles more likely to use drugs upon leaving prison.
Stepping back and viewing the complete set of results presented thus far, our …ndings are somewhat di¤erent from Aizer and Doyle (2015) who examined the e¤ect of juvenile incarceration on adult crime using a very similar estimation strategy. Speci…cally, they …nd that juvenile incarceration increases the likelihood of adult incarceration for all types of crimes using data from Chicago/Cook County, which is a highly urban area. Our study, on the other hand, uses data from the entire state of Louisiana, which includes juveniles from both urban and rural areas of the state. Nevertheless, the di¤erences in the results between the two studies are not attributable to community type di¤erences in respective samples, because as shown in Table C1 (online appendix), our results remain intact when we limit our sample to urban areas of the state, including only New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Je¤erson parishes.
As shown at the end of Online Appendix C (Table C4) , the di¤erences between the results cannot be explained by demographic di¤erences between our sample and the Chicago 23 Longer prison time can also lead to negative labor market outcomes which in turn may lead to stress and drug use. types, these di¤erence may help explain the striking divergence in the impact of juvenile incarceration on property crime. Note also that this explanation does not contradict with the conjecture that emotional stress generated by exposure to longer prison stay leading to higher drug convictions in adulthood.
Incarceration and High School Completion
Because we can link the juvenile o¤enders with the public high school records in the state, we can also investigate the impact of incarceration as a juvenile on the probability of completing 27 00872 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology high school. That is, we replace our outcome of interest in equation (1) with an indicator for high school graduation and re-run OLS and IV regressions. The results from this exercise are reported in Table 8 . The OLS regressions indicate about a 5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of high school graduation following juvenile incarceration (Panel A). However, when we estimate the same model with instrumental variables as before, we …nd that juvenile incarceration has no impact on high school graduation for convicted juveniles (Columns 1-2 of Panel B, Table 8 ). This result is di¤erent from Aizer and Doyle (2015) who report that juvenile incarceration has a negative impact on high school completion in Chicago/Cook
County. In an attempt to reconcile these con ‡icting results, we partition the data as birth cohorts from (i) 1979 to 1982, and (ii) 1983 to 1987. The former group partially overlaps with the birth cohorts used by Aizer and Doyle (2015) .
Column (3) of Table 8 presents the IV speci…cation which allows the impact of juvenile incarceration to di¤er between these two cohorts. 24 The estimated e¤ect of incarceration for earlier birth cohorts indicates a statistically signi…cant 15 percentage point reduction (49 percent relative to early cohorts'sample mean) in the likelihood of high school graduation for convicted juveniles, while the point estimate for more recent cohorts is positive but insigni…cant. 25 We also conduct the same analysis by (i) dropping GED recipients from the e¤ective sample (around 20 percent of all high school graduates) and (ii) rede…ning early cohorts to include years from 1979 to 1983. Doing so does not alter the results. For 24 The Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistics (reported at the bottom of Table 8 ) shows that weak identi…cation is not a concern for either of our endogenous variables. 25 We also tried controlling for dropout status of juvenile o¤enders at the time of disposition. Less than 9 percent of our sample is ‡agged as being a dropout by the disposition date. The estimated e¤ect of incarceration from this exercise for earlier birth cohorts indicates a statistically signi…cant 16 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of high school graduation for marginal convicted juveniles, while the point estimate for more recent cohorts is small positive and insigni…cant. example, the estimated e¤ect for earlier cohorts indicates a 12 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of standard high school diploma when we exclude GED recipients. The obvious question is: what could be the source of this di¤erential e¤ect?
The Louisiana School and District Accountability system was adopted by the state's Board of Elementary and Secondary Education in June 1998. The state identi…ed 10-and 20-year goals for all public schools and required schools to demonstrate progress toward these goals, which included targets in test scores, increases in attendance and reduction in the dropout rates ). As part of the new accountability system, …rst-time tenth grade students were required to take graduation exit exams (GEE) in English, math, science and social studies to be eligible for a standard high school diploma. 26 This new testbased promotion policy became e¤ective in the 2000-2001 academic year. Students failing to achieve the minimum requirements in all portions of the standardized tests even after multiple attempts were not be able to obtain a diploma. The high school experience of more recent cohorts of juveniles in Louisiana coincides with this policy adoption, which suggests that the new accountability system may have led to di¤erential e¤ects across birth cohorts.
To further explore this hypothesis, we plot high school graduation trends over birth cohorts disaggregated by juvenile incarceration status in Figure 2 . The horizontal axis identi…es the birth cohort. High school graduation rates of incarcerated juveniles, represented by the solid line, remained rather steady across birth cohorts. This may not be surprising as it represents a potential ‡oor e¤ect, i.e., high school graduation rates of incarcerated juveniles are consistently low (around 20 percent), and therefore they are not responsive 26 More precisely, GEE English and math were administered in grade 10. Science and social studies were administered in grade 11 (GEE Interpretive Guide, Louisiana Department of Educationvarious years). it more di¢ cult to obtain a high school degree, as shown in Figure 2 , and this may have led to a decline in the high school graduation rates of those juveniles who were delinquent, but not incarcerated. Put di¤erently, the exit exams that were introduced by the education reform may have induced some non-incarcerated juveniles to drop out of high school, but it had no impact on already-low graduation rate of incarcerated juveniles.
As a robustness check, we re-estimated the model in column (3) of Table 8 by re-de…ning "Early Cohort." Speci…cally, when we de…ne the "Early Cohort" as those born in 1981 or earlier, or as those born in 1980 or earlier, the estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term is small, and not di¤erent from zero. 27 This …nding is consistent with the time-series behavior of the graduation rates presented in Figure 2 , and it supports the hypothesis that the education reform in Louisiana, which increased the high school graduation standards, eliminated the di¤erential graduation rates between incarcerated and non-incarcerated juveniles by reducing the graduation rates of the non-incarcerated. This explanation is also consistent with a number of existing studies that …nd adverse e¤ects of high school exit exams on graduation rates, in particular for students from disadvantaged backgrounds (Dee and Jacob 2007). 27 When we estimate the e¤ects of juvenile incarceration on adult recidivism by birth cohorts, the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in the text. In contrast, exploiting random assignment of cases to judges and using judge stringency in punishment as an instrument, Aizer and Doyle (2015) found that juvenile incarceration generates a drop in high school completion and an increase in adult recidivism in Chicago/Cook County.
In this paper we focus on the state of Louisiana and use the universe of case …les of juveniles who were found guilty by juvenile courts between 1996 and 2004. We link these individuals to the records from the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections that contain information on their adult convictions until 2012. We also link these records to the Louisiana Department of Education to determine whether the juvenile has completed high school.
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We make use of the institutional structure that randomly assigns juvenile case …les to judges and create an instrument for having been sentenced to prison based on the idiosyncratic harshness of the judge in his/her incarceration proclivity. Instrumental variables regressions reveal that incarceration as a juvenile reduces future property crime convictions, but increases the propensity of conviction for a drug o¤ense in adulthood. Incarceration as a juvenile has no impact on future violent crime convictions. We propose mechanisms related to deterioration of emotional well-being due to incarceration and the existence of well-structured rehabilitation programs for incarcerated juveniles in explaining the results.
Several robustness checks and additional estimations addressing various sample selection is-
sues support our …ndings. Finally, we …nd that incarceration as a juvenile has no impact on high school completion propensity, except for younger cohorts. The reason for this …nding is tied to an education reform (graduate exit exams), implemented in Louisiana beginning with the 2000-2001 academic year, which made it di¢ cult to graduate from high school.
Our results indicate that juvenile incarceration is a double-edged sword which deters future property crimes but makes drug convictions more likely in adulthood. Thus, it may be di¢ cult to make a …rm policy recommendation. That being said, reducing time spent in prison in conjunction with making enhanced rehabilitation programs available (and perhaps mandatory) as part of non-incarceration punishment may produce welfare improving outcomes for marginal convicted juveniles. Table 2 and the text for further details. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
IV Results

Coefficients (Standard Errors)
Reduced Form 41 00872 9
Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Juvenile controls include indicators for juvenile's gender and race as well as age and its square. There are 136 detailed offense types in the baseline sample. Time in secure facility indicates the total time spent in detention. Colum 1 compares juveniles who were not incarcerated to juveniles with short stay (less than or equal to 209 days) while Column 2 compares juveniles who were not incarcerated to juveniles with longer stay (more than 209 days). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Table 2 and the text for further details. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 43 00872 9 
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